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INTRODUCTION TO THE  
“LOCKETT V. OHIO AT 40 SYMPOSIUM”: 
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY 40 YEARS
AFTER THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Margery B. Koosed* 
Thank you to our speakers (present and participating by web), 
attending lawyers, law students, faculty, staff,  members of the community 
here and participating by web–thank you all for joining in our Lockett v. 
Ohio at 40 Symposium.1 
I am Marge Koosed, a Professor of Law Emerita here at the 
University of Akron School of Law. I have taught in the area of criminal 
law, criminal procedure, and death penalty law for over 40 years. I first 
arrived at the law school in 1974, the same year Ohio enacted the death 
penalty law we will be discussing, Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.04. 
Indeed, as I recall, as then Coordinator of the Legal Clinic’s Appellate 
Review Office, I assisted four death-sentenced Akron-area inmates on 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court challenging that law. 
Ultimately, the Court accepted review in two other cases—that of Akron-
area death row inmate Sandra Lockett and Cincinnati-area juvenile death 
row inmate Willie Lee Bell. The Court’s response, set forth in the Lockett 
v. Ohio2  decision, is our subject today.
As we will see, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lockett hinges on 
individualized sentencing, on respect for the uniqueness of each 
individual facing a capital charge. Though we will focus on defendant’s 
lives, as the Court did in that case, I want us to acknowledge at this time 
the uniqueness and respect we also owe the victims of homicide, and the 
loss experienced by their families, in all of these death penalty cases.  The 
* Professor of Law Emerita, University of Akron School.
1. An audio recording of the Lockett Symposium is available at this link on YouTube (Oct. 
15, 2018), and program materials are available at this link. 
2. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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Supreme Court would later make that clear in Payne v. Tennessee.3 But 
the loss remains—we know that no law or Supreme Court decision can 
restore those lives lost. 
This past spring, the Center for Constitutional Law here at the 
University of Akron School of Law, one of two established by Congress 
in celebration of the bicentennial  of the Constitution, issued a call for 
papers to commemorate the July 3, 1978 Lockett v. Ohio decision from 
the U.S. Supreme Court. As our call related: 
Argued by the brilliant Professor Tony Amsterdam, the decision laid the 
framework for narrowing application of the death penalty. Lockett not 
only overturned Ohio’s 1974 era death penalty law, it heralded the sig-
nificance and breadth of mitigating factors that must be considered by 
jurors and judges making the life or death decision in the penalty phase 
of capital cases, and tapped in to issues of disproportionate sentencing 
(those decided and yet to be). 
The papers submitted are published here as part of this symposium. 
Our writing contributors include all of Sandra’s counsel in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, her co-defendant’s counsel, law professors at New York 
University and City University of New York, a Fulbright scholar in 
France, and the National Mitigation Coordinator for federal public 
defender agencies. 
In addition, in attendance we have Sandra Lockett’s co-counsel in 
the state appellate and lower federal courts, and Sandra Lockett Young 
herself. Finally, we are pleased that the executive director of Ohioans to 
Stop Executions, and both the executive director and chief researcher of 
the nationally recognized Washington D.C. based Death Penalty 
Information Center (DPIC), are participating by web. We also have two 
of the most experienced death penalty defense litigators in Ohio available 
for comments. 
We proceed to first look at the Lockett litigation itself, hearing from 
her counsel, other counsel, and from Sandra Lockett.  Then we address 
the impact of the Supreme Court decision on death penalty litigation, its 
significance, and engage in some critique with our writers. Finally, we 
discuss the current condition and future of the death penalty, nationally 
and in Ohio. 
Before we address the Lockett litigation itself, it helps to sketch out 
the historical context and a few critical Supreme Court precedents.  As 
described in Chapter 1 of Hugo Bedau’s classic work The Death Penalty 
3. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
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in America: Current Controversies,4 in the colonial and early American 
period, execution was a common sentence for murder (but not 
manslaughter), and at times rape, robbery, and kidnapping.5  An evolution 
away from the death penalty began in the 19th century when Pennsylvania 
and other jurisdictions began to distinguish first degree murder and second 
degree murder, the latter being punished by incarceration, and states 
began to choose incarceration for commission of other major felonies.6 A 
few states abolished the death penalty in all cases.7  In the 1932 decision 
of Powell v. Alabama,8 and reaffirmed in the 1963 Gideon v. Wainwright 
case,9 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that impoverished capitally-charged 
defendants were entitled to counsel paid for at state expense, to assure 
reliable determinations of guilt or innocence. 
Over this entire period, when a deliberating jury found a capital 
defendant guilty, the jury would immediately proceed to simultaneously 
deliberate on whether to recommend mercy (a life sentence) or not—
hearing no additional evidence respecting the appropriateness of a death 
or life sentence.10  Few states imposed a mandatory death sentence–
instead the jury was given full discretion, and little, if any, information to 
make this literally life or death decision.11 
In the 1960’s an informal moratorium on carrying out executions 
developed, due to concerns about race discrimination, arbitrary 
impositions, and wrongful convictions.12  In 1971, the U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed to examine this death penalty system. In the landmark case 
of Furman v. Georgia,13 argued by the same Professor Tony Amsterdam 
who would later argue Sandra Lockett’s case, the Supreme Court ruled 
the system violated the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection 
clauses. Two justices found the death penalty per se unconstitutional.14 
Three found that discretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively 
4. HUGO BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (Oxford 
University Press 1997). 
5. Id. at 3-4. 
6. Id. at 4-6. 
7. Id. at 7-8. 
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
10. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 5-6 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 13-16. 
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
14. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring) and id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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defined standards, was unconstitutional.15 All of the death sentences then 
imposed throughout the country were ultimately overturned and replaced 
by life sentences. 
Many state legislatures responded by passing new death penalty 
provisions establishing guided discretion systems, using as a model the 
Model Penal Code Section 210.6.16 Other states adopted mandatory death 
sentencing schemes. In 1976, the Court heard five cases addressing five 
of these legislative responses. 
In Gregg v. Georgia,17 the Court (5-4) upheld the guided discretion 
scheme in Georgia that included three features: a requirement of proof of 
statutory aggravating circumstances that narrowed the class of eligible 
murderers, allowed for consideration of mitigating circumstances calling 
for a sentence less than death, and required state appellate review directed 
at assuring against arbitrary and capricious or discriminatory death-
sentencing.18 The sentencing schemes of Florida and Texas appeared to 
roughly approximate these requirements, and were upheld in Proffitt v. 
Florida and Jurek v. Texas.19 
At the same time, in 1976, the mandatory death sentencing schemes 
established by North Carolina and Louisiana were struck down because 
they undermined reliability as jurors were sometimes refusing to convict 
when the death sentence was automatic, and because mandatory 
sentencing was not individualized–it failed to permit consideration of the 
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of 
the particular offense.20 
This is the backdrop when Ohio’s 1974 era death penalty legislation 
reaches the Court two years later, in 1978. Ohio’s scheme provided for 
proof of aggravating circumstances and a two-stage appellate review, but 
required a death sentence unless the sentencing judge found one of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) the victim had induced 
or facilitated the offense, or 2) it was unlikely the offender would have 
committed the offense but for the fact the offender was under duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation, or 3) the offense was primarily the 
product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency.21 
15. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and id. at 313
(White, J. concurring). 
16. American Law Institute, Proposed Official Draft 1962. 
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
18. Id. at 205-07.
19. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
20. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 
633, 637 (1976). Both of these cases, and Jurek, were argued by Professor Tony Amsterdam.  
21. Lockett, 438 U.S. at  593-94 (1978) (referencing then §§ O.R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04). 
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In providing for consideration of a limited list of possible mitigating 
circumstances calling for a penalty less than death, this legislation was 
akin to those upheld in Texas and Florida two years earlier. But it still did 
not permit the sentencing judge to consider as mitigating factors Sandra 
Lockett’s character, her prior record (minor misdemeanors but no felony 
offenses), her age (of 21),22 her lack of specific intent to cause death 
(indeed, no one planned to kill the pawnshop owner in the course of the 
contemplated robbery, but the owner grabbed the gun and it went off), and 
her relatively minor part in the crime of robbery (even acceding to the 
prosecution’s theory of the case, which was based on testimony from the 
trigger-person who struck a deal, she was not even in the pawnshop).23 As 
we will see, the Supreme Court in Lockett (6-2) finds the Ohio statute 
offends the Eighth Amendment principle of individualized sentencing 
identified in Woodson v. North Carolina, and that Ohio’s quasi-
mandatory sentencing scheme must be struck down.24 
The two year period between Jurek, Proffitt, and the Court’s decision 
in Lockett may have been critical. The delay was brought about by Ohio, 
unlike the two other states, having provided for an intermediate appellate 
review in the district courts of appeal before a death case proceeded to the 
Ohio Supreme Court. Sandra Lockett’s co-counsel Joel Berger at the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund later suggested that had Ohio’s scheme 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 with Jurek, the similarities 
between the Ohio and Texas schemes might have led to the Court finding 
Ohio’s scheme fell into the “Jurek sinkhole,” and Sandra Lockett’s death 
sentence may have been affirmed. Instead, the Lockett decision’s 
requirement that the sentencing jury be able to consider and give effect to 
all relevant mitigating evidence prevailed. Over the following decade, 
Florida’s 1976-approved system of limiting the sentencer to statutory 
mitigating factors was unanimously found to violate the Lockett line of 
cases (eventually, after 16 executions under it raising the issue).25 
Similarly, Texas’ 1976-approved system also fell in most respects to 
Lockett’s mandate.26 
As a direct consequence of the Lockett decision, Sandra Lockett’s 
death sentence, and that of about one hundred others on Ohio death row, 
was overturned. 
22. The companion case of Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978), involved the younger age of 16, 
23. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590, 597.
24. Id.
25. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); see DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST 
OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH ROW 300-01 (1995). 
26. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); but see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993). 
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As an aside, one might wonder how Sandra Lockett was convicted 
of the death-eligible crime of aggravated murder with the aggravating 
circumstance of felony murder on these facts. The prosecution was also 
concerned, and thrice offered her a plea to a lesser offense after a co-
defendant who was in the pawnshop was sentenced to life due to mental 
deficiency, and after the trigger-person received life through a plea deal. 
The prosecution once offered a plea to voluntary manslaughter and 
aggravated robbery, and then just prior to, and during trial, a plea to 
aggravated murder without specifications.27 She refused the offers, and 
was convicted on the basis of a felony-murder mens rea jury instruction 
that would, a year later, be declared unconstitutional as creating a 
presumption that an accomplice intended to kill, a presumption that 
conflicted with the burden that is always on the prosecutor to prove the 
element of intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.28  Sadly, her counsel 
failed to object to this jury instruction at trial, and Sandra’s later petition 
for federal habeas corpus relief to overturn her conviction on this basis 
was denied because trial counsel had not preserved the issue.29  Sandra 
was released on parole in 1993, returned to Akron, and completed her 
parole period. She has been kind enough to speak to my classes often, and 
to do so today. 
With that backdrop, the symposium proceeded with Sandra Lockett, 
Gerry Simmons (her co-counsel in the state appeals and lower federal 
courts), and writing contributor Dennis Balske (her brother and co-
defendant James Lockett’s counsel), relating their insights on the trial, 
state appeal, and later federal habeas corpus litigation.  Sandra described 
the isolation she felt, death row conditions, how she adjusted to life by 
living each day as fully as she could, and what effective representation of 
a capital defendant should entail from the client’s perspective.  Gerry 
Simmons focused on the pre-trial and trial aspects of the case. He got 
involved in Sandra’s case before trial when her family retained him for 
$1,000 after Sandra and her family were disappointed by her appointed 
counsel. But he was told by the trial judge that he would not be allowed 
to take an active role because he was an out-of-town lawyer and that local 
counsel would handle the case. He returned the retainer to the family. He 
regrets not being involved, because he would have made needed 
objections to the court’s actions. But on the other hand, he rejoices in the 
fact that Sandra’s conviction and death sentence ultimately led to life 
27. Id. at 591-92. 
28. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
29. See Lockett v. Arn, 740 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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sentences for hundreds of others in Ohio and around the country due to 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision.  Simmons later co-counselled the state 
appeals and federal habeas proceedings with the very well-respected 
Capital University Law School Clinical Professor Max Kravitz, who has 
since passed away. Simmons went to Cleveland Marshall Law School, 
practices criminal defense in Columbus, has handled many capital cases, 
with no death verdicts for the last 34 years, and has served on the boards 
of the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and the Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Here, he provides death 
penalty practice pointers in addition to his thoughts on the case. 
At the symposium and in his written submission, Dennis Balske, 
counsel for Sandra’s brother (and separately tried co-defendant) James 
Lockett, describes James’ litigation which included a mistrial and retrial. 
He relates his impressions of the trial judge and prosecutors, and the later 
gross and tawdry professional misconduct of the trial judge. Dennis 
Balske is well-known to capital defense litigators, having served as what 
I would call a “guru” in the field.  Dennis Balske got his J.D. from Ohio 
State Law School and taught their criminal defense practicum from 1975-
1978. He then joined the Southern Poverty Law Center, defending 
capitally charged defendants throughout the South, and becoming the 
Center’s Legal Director. During that period, at my invitation, Dennis 
wrote the seminal article on defending capital cases for the Akron Law 
Review.30 In 1986, he entered private practice, and later founded the 
Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and served on the board 
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, chairing its 
Death Penalty and Amicus Curiae Committees. Dennis Balske eventually 
relocated to Portland, Oregon where he spent nine years in the federal 
public defender office, and is now in private practice specializing in post-
conviction litigation. 
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Sandra was represented by Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam, and by Peggy Cooper-Davis and Joel Berger, then 
with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”). LDF was founded by 
Thurgood Marshall in 1940; it has fought against racial discrimination and 
defended murder cases around the country. 
Writing contributor and advocate at the U. S. Supreme Court, now 
New York University Professor, Tony Amsterdam provides a tribute to 
Sandra Lockett for this symposium that concisely and beautifully conveys 
the highs and lows of capital defense litigation, the importance of the case 
30. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON LAW REV.
331 (1979). 
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he won that has significantly reduced the frequency of seeking and 
imposing death in this country, and the hope that it will eventually lead to 
abolition. Amsterdam is a brilliant legal scholar and litigator, the most 
accomplished Clinical Professor in the United States (first at Penn, then 
Stanford, then NYU), and indeed, through his work on the ABA’s 
McCrate Report, he was instrumental in assuring that all law students get 
ample skills training. For decades Tony Amsterdam was the foremost pro 
bono attorney and advocate on civil rights and criminal cases in the U.S. 
When a case is headed to the Supreme Court, Tony was the person you 
wanted to argue it, or if that is or was not possible, you sought his insights 
and direction. I had the privilege of being part of Tony’s working groups 
on several death penalty cases–the words “amazing” and “awe-inspiring” 
do not do him justice. Unfortunately, Tony has now retired from teaching 
and is “living in the boondocks” as he told me, where videoconferencing 
is not practicable, and for other reasons he has somewhat limited his pro 
bono workload. But he could not let these circumstances prevent his 
participation in this symposium. He asked that I “read this short tribute to 
Sandra with my love” at this conference. He closes his moving tribute 
with the observation that when abolition is achieved “Sandra Lockett, 
whose strength of will and power to survive we are commemorating here, 
will take her rightful place in the history of the struggle for decency in 
criminal justice”. 
Now at NYU Law School as well, writing contributor Professor 
Peggy Cooper Davis co-counselled Sandra’s case in the Supreme Court 
while at LDF. She now teaches constitutional law, evidence, and social 
sciences and the law. Unfortunately, she taught class and could not join 
the symposium, but also asked that we include her letter. In it, Professor 
Davis provides further insight into race and the death penalty, and recalls 
how she marveled at Sandra Lockett’s “courage under what seemed to be 
the surreal circumstances” of being sent to death row while so “remotely 
linked to the killings of which (she was) accused,” and the “raging sense 
of injustice she must feel.” She posits that “Justices of the Supreme Court 
must have sensed the disproportionality of Sandra Lockett’s sentence on 
any account of the events leading to the pawn broker’s death.” 
Joel Berger, then also at LDF, co-counselled and sat second-chair at 
the Lockett oral argument. Now in private practice in New York City 
specializing in civil rights cases, submitted his recollections in writing.  In 
his piece, Berger recalls the briefing process, the expectation that the Bell 
case would become the lead case, and some difficult moments during the 
oral argument. 
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Transitioning to the impact of the Lockett decision and its 
significance, as Professor Tony Amsterdam noted, Lockett has led to a 
focus on mitigation as a defense against imposition of the death penalty. 
Writing contributor Russ Stetler has served as the National Mitigation 
Coordinator for the federal death penalty projects for the last thirteen 
years and has authored many articles on mitigation investigation in his 
work around the country over the last 38 years. He writes that Lockett has 
engendered a team approach to capital defense litigation, with mitigation 
specialist professionals conducting full social history investigations to 
provide defense lawyers and fact-finders with information leading to or 
constituting relevant mitigating evidence, and he details capital defense 
counsel’s duty to investigate and present such relevant mitigating 
evidence. 
Writing contributor City University of New York Law School 
Professor Jeff Kirchmeier is a Case Western Reserve University Law 
School graduate who was a staff attorney at the Arizona Capital 
Representation Project. He previously taught at Tulane Law School. He 
has written extensively on criminal procedure, constitutional law, and the 
death penalty, including the racial implications of use of that penalty in 
his book Imprisoned by the Past: Warren McCleskey, Race, and the 
American Death Penalty. He writes that by requiring the consideration of 
individualized mitigating factors, the Lockett decision saved the death 
penalty, but that it may be a poison pill which at the same time condemned 
the death penalty by means of creeping arbitrary or discriminatory 
decision-making. 
Writing contributor Jordan Berman is presently doing federal habeas 
and state clemency defense as a research and writing attorney at the 
Federal Public Defender in Columbus. He also serves as an adjunct 
professor on appellate advocacy at the Ohio State University Moritz 
School of Law. His written contribution to the symposium focuses on 
Justice White’s Lockett concurrence. Justice White dissented from the 
plurality’s position on consideration of mitigating circumstances,31 but 
concurred in reversal of the death sentence in this case because there was 
no finding that Sandra Lockett “possessed a purpose to cause the death of 
the victim.”32  As Berman discusses, this concurrence led to an evolving 
mens rea standard for death-eligibility in later cases addressing 
31. 438 U.S. at 621-24. 
32. Id. at 625. 
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disproportionate sentencing.33 He urges the Court to maintain Justice 
White’s mandate. 
Writing contributor Karen Steele is a capital defense lawyer in 
Oregon. With her J.D. from Washington University, she has written on 
neuroscience and the law and mens rea.  She writes about the threat to 
Lockett’s mandate arising from double-edged evidence, i.e. rightfully 
mitigating evidence that could be seen as aggravating, often as 
establishing future dangerousness. She urges specialized jury instructions 
to assure that the evidence is seen solely as mitigating. 
Steele’s concern is well-appreciated in most death-sentencing states, 
where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are both found or 
determined in the penalty phase, and/or where future dangerousness is 
specified as an aggravating factor.  As I have written elsewhere,34 Ohio’s 
present scheme differs from that of other states in ways that reduce this 
concern. Future dangerousness is not specified as an aggravating factor in 
Ohio. Further, in Ohio, the statutory aggravating circumstances are set 
forth in the indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the trial (not 
penalty) phase, and if proven and non-duplicative, are carried over into 
the penalty phase with no expansion–it is only the statutory aggravating 
circumstances so proven that are weighed against mitigation.35 The 
penalty phase is designed for the presentation of mitigation alone, and the 
prosecutor is limited to presenting only such evidence that denies or rebuts 
the existence of those mitigating factors raised by the defense.36 Because 
no non-statutory aggravating circumstances are to be weighed, it is less 
likely that rebuttal of a mitigating circumstance will lead to aggravating 
weight being accorded. In addition, because Ohio judges “should not 
instruct on mitigating factors not raised by the defense,”37 there is less 
likelihood the jury will learn of other mitigating factors that were not 
presented and somehow turn their absence into aggravating facts. So Ohio 
practice provides some assurances against Ms. Steele’s quite-appropriate 
concern. 
33. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) 
(like Lockett, felony-murder cases); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (imposition of death on 
those with intellectual disabilities). 
34. See Margery Koosed, “Rethinking How We Bifurcate: the Ohio Example” in Averting 
Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of 
Lingering Doubt, 19 NO. ILLINOIS LAW REV. 41, 104-07 (2001). 
35. See Ohio Revised Code §§ 2929.03 & 2929.04. 
36. State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988).
37. Ohio Jury Instructions, Criminal CR 503.010, cmt. p. 78 (Ohio Judicial Conference,
3/2015) (citing DePew). 
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Writing contributor Dr. Cynthia Boyer appears by web from France 
where she teaches civil liberties, American Constitutional Law, and 
Political Developments at the Institut National Universitaire 
Champollion, Universite Toulouse Capitole.  A Fulbright Alumni in U.S. 
Politics and Law, she writes that it has been difficult to define mitigating 
factors or their impacts on a fair trial, that the Supreme Court is divided 
in its appreciation of the individualization mandate, and that there are 
concerns about stare decisis. 
Having a helpful picture of the impact of the Lockett decision, the 
symposium proceeds to turn to the lingering concerns surrounding the 
death penalty, and its possible future, with five go-to experts on the 
subject.  Writing contributor Kevin Werner is Executive Director of the 
non-profit Ohioans to Stop Executions, on which I sit as a member of the 
board. A day before the symposium, he penned an op-ed in the local 
Akron Beacon Journal newspaper, entitled “Ohio’s Broken Death 
Penalty.”38  Werner relates the failures of Ohio’s system to protect 
innocents from wrongful convictions and death sentences (Ohio has had 
nine death-sentenced exonerees), the racial and geographic disparities in 
imposition of the Ohio death penalty, the enormous costs in pursuing 
death as opposed to life sentences, and the relative waste of taxpayer funds 
as prosecutors fail to get the death penalty in almost 90% of these 
expensive cases. 
In discussion, four other experts on death penalty litigation 
confirmed the Ohio experience, and that it is consistent with what is 
occurring at the national level.  Rob Dunham is Executive Director of the 
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) in Washington D.C., the 
nationally-recognized and oft-awarded resource of all things death 
penalty. Before coming to the DPIC position in 2015, Rob litigated death 
penalty cases and taught this area of the law at Villanova Law School. 
Rob provides insights into the possible impact of Justice Kennedy’s 
departure and replacement on the U.S. Supreme Court, recent trends in 
race and geographic disparity, and relative costs of the death penalty. 
Ngozi Ndulue, a capital defense litigator and Yale J.D., just joined the 
DPIC as the Director of Research and Special Projects, having served in 
a similar capacity at the Ohio Justice and Policy Center in Cincinnati, and 
as Senior Director of Criminal Justice Programs at the national NAACP 
in New York City.  In discussion, she expanded on Rob’s points, and 
speaks to the moral lessons gleaned from the Lockett decision. 
38. AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 14, 2018, at https://www.ohio.com/opinion/20181014/kevin-
werner-ohios-broken-death-penalty.  
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Lastly, in discussion, are experienced Ohio capital defense litigators 
David Stebbins and Jeff Gamso. David Stebbins is another Cleveland 
Marshall J.D., and probably the most-experienced death penalty 
appellate/post-conviction defense lawyer in Ohio. I first got to know 
David when he started the death penalty section at the Ohio Public 
Defender Office in 1982. I worked with him on capital defense training 
materials and more for 11 years, when he went briefly to the Tennessee 
Capital Resource Center. He returned to Ohio in 1995 and did capital 
defense work in private practice until 2008, when he joined the Capital 
Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defenders Office in Columbus. He 
provides a view from the federal habeas trenches, which bears out others’ 
concerns and more. Similarly, capital defense lawyer Jeff Gamso, now at 
the Cuyahoga County Public Defender Appellate Division, formerly in 
private practice in Toledo and Legal Director of the Ohio ACLU, 
comments further on the importance of mitigation. He considers the 
Lockett decision among the most significant of U.S. Supreme Court cases. 
While much has been written here and elsewhere, given the 
significance of the Lockett decision, there will undoubtedly be more to 
come.  We hope that by this Lockett v. Ohio at 40 Symposium, we have 
“done justice” to this watershed case, its progeny, and those it has 
impacted. 
